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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GEORGE A. SIMS, M. K. SIMS,
ELMER L. SIMS AND G. GRAN('
SIMS, d/b/a SALT LAKFj
TRANSFER COMPANY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

CASE

No. 7377

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH AND MAGNAGARFIELD TRUCK LINE, a
corporation,
Defendants.

BRTF,F

01~ DEFJ<~NDAN1'~

NUPPJ. . J;jl\iJ;~N'l'AL

Wl'A'l'l~jJ\J EN'I'

OF F AC'rEi

'l'he statPnwnt of facts eontai1w<l in plaintiffs' hri<'i'
fails to sPt forth eertain PvidPnrP \'ital to the rights in
t lwsp IH"O<'P<'dings of dE~fendant ::\1 agna-Ga rl'i<~ld 'I' ruck
Line. It is, therefore, dePnwd neeessary to suppl<'ment
plaintiffs' statement of facts, in order to prrsPnt to tlw
Court the full fon•p of tlw PvidPn<'<~ n•<•Pi VPd h.v tlw
Public Surviee Commission, upon whi<'h it tltmiP<l plaintiffs' application for a contract carrier's permit.
1

The defendant Magna-Garfield Truck Line is a consolidated corporation organized and existing under and
by virtue of the laws of the State of Utah, consisting of
two former corporations organized and existing under
the laws of the State of Utah, known and designated as
Magna-Garfield Truck Line and Salt Lake & Bingham
Freight Lines. The said defendant received its Certificate of Incorporation from the Secretary of State of
Utah on the 31st day of December, 1946. (R. 113, 114)
Salt Lake & Bingham Freight Lines (being one of the
consolidating corporations as aforesaid) was the owner
and holder as a common motor carrier of property in
intra-state commerce of the following Certificates of
Convenience and Necessity issued by the Public Service
Commission of U.tah (R. 115):
Certificate
No.

Date

Case
No.

296

April 21, 1927

963

65R

April 23, 1945

2R33

Said Magna-Garfield Truck Line (being also one of the
consolidating corporations as aforesaid) was the owner
and holder as a common motor carrier of property in
intra-state commerce of the following Certificate of
·Convenience and Necessity issued by the Public Service
Commission of Utah (R. 114, 115):
Certificate
No.

Date

Case
No.

262

March 6, 1946

847

In a proc~x~ding instFuted before t 11e P·:blic Serv~ce>
Commission of Utah on the 5th day of February, 1947,
by said defendant company, in the matter of the application of Magna-Garfield Truck Line, a consolidated corporation of Magna-Garfield Truck Line and Salt Lake &
Bingham Freight Lines, designated No. 3092, the said
Commission, by order dated the 6th day of May, 1947
(R. l13, 118) did cancel and annul Certificate of Conveniene(~ and Necessity No. 262, issued to said Magna-Garfield Truck Line (being one of the consolidating corporations) in Case No. 847, and Certificates of Conveniencf~
and· Necessity Nos. 296 and 658 issued to Salt Lake &
Bingham Freight Lines (heing one of the consolidating
corporations) in Cases Nos. 963 and 2833, and in lieu
thereof said Commission issued unto defendant company
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 771 (R.113)
to operate as common motor carrier for the transportation of commodities generally from Salt Lake City, Utah,
to Garfield, Utah, over United States Highway No. 91 to
junction with United States Highway No. 50, thence
over United States Highway No. 50 and return over the
same route, including all intermediate points and offroute point of Bacchus, Utah; and from Salt Lake City,
Utah, to West Jordan, South Jordan, Riverton, Bluffdale, Herriman and Bingham, Utah, over United States
Highway No. 91 and State and County roads and return,
including all intermediate points, except that no service
was authorized on United States Highway No. 91 between
33rd South St. and Sandy, Utah, including Midvale, Utah.
Acting under and by virtue of the authority con-

3

tain'ed in and incidental to said Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity No. 771 as aforesaid, defendant MagnaGarfield Truck Line (the consolidated corporation) has
continuously since the 6th day of May, 1947, operated
as a common carrier for the transportation of commodities generally over and upon the aforesaid routes de. scribed in said Certificate of Convenience and N ecessitv.
.
(R. 140, 141, J42)
The defendant Magna-Garfield Truck Line has in
all respects and particulars complied with the terms,
eonditions and restrictions contained in said Certificate
of Convenience and Necessity (R. 140) and in particular
said defendant has maintained on file with the aforesaid
Commission all insurance required by Jaw, and all tariff!';,
containing complete information as to rates, rules, regulations and schedules. (R. 140) Said defendant has
operated as a common motor carrier of commodities
over the aforesaid routes at all times in accordance with
the statutes of the State of Utah and the rules and regulations of the Public Service Commission of Utah existing
on the date of said Certificate of Convenience and N ecessity, and which were thereafter prescribed by sairl
Commission, governing the operations of common motor
carriers over the public highways of the State of Utah.
( R. 140)
For a long time prior to the granting of said Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 771, the two consolidating corpo~ations aforesaid (predecessors of this
defendant) opei·ated over the aforesaid routes described
in the aforesaid Certificate ·Of Convenienae and Necessity,
4

as common motor carriers of commodities generally, an.l
rendered unto the publie reasonably adequate and continuous servie{~ as such carriers. ( R. 114, 115, 141) Na~d
defendant, as the consolidated corporation, ha~ contimwd
said operation, and has fulfilled all requirements of law
and all of the requirements and regulations of the aforesaid Public Service Commission in the aforesaid operations. (R. 140, 141) The said defendant has operated
upon a regular schedule, averaging three truck movements per day from Salt Lake City to Bingham and
Lark and return. (R. 142, 153) The sa:id defendant
company owns four trucks capable of handling five
tons, or 10,000 pounds each, three trucks capable of handling ten tons, or 20,000 pounds each, one pickup truck,
and one ten-ton semi-trailer. (R. 142) It has twelve
employees, six of whom are regularly employed as truck
drivers. ( R. 143, 155) Two of its shop men are also
qualified truck drivers, and can be used in emergency
to drive trucks. ( R. 155) Its trucks are capable of handling 100,000 pounds of commodities per- day. ( R. 145)
It is able to rent trucks for operations in excess of its
normal operations or scheduled runs. (R. 145) All equipment is in "A-1 condition". (R. 144)
The West Jordan plant of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company is located about ten miles south of Salt Lake City,
on Redwood Road. The factory itself stands about two
or three blocks from the highway. (R. 142) The defendant company operates its scheduled freight service over
Redwood Road from Salt Lake City to Binghar:1 and
Lark. (R. 142) 'l'lw (l0f0ndant company has tahn car0
;)

•

of all requests made by the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company
to move sugar from West Jordan to Salt Lake City, with
one exception. (R. 144) This exception involved a telephone cal'i in the late afternoon, whereby the Sugar
Company requested a truck at its \Vest Jordan plant
within one-half hour. The defendant company informed
the Sugar Company that it would provide a truck within
two hourioi, which still permitted the movement of the
sugar into Salt Lake City the same day. (R. 144) This
episode occurred during the peak season of sugar haulage in .June. • (R. 144) The handling of sugar does not
require any unusual or extraordinary equipment othe-:.·
than it must be of such nature as to keep the sugar dry.
(R. 107, 146) The equipment of the defendant MagnaGarfield Truck Line is of that nature, four trucks being
closed trucks. (R. 146) Said defendant has handled both
l.t.l. shipments and t.l. shipments, some of the shipments
being from the Sugar Factory to towns served directly
by said defendant. 'l'hese shipments were usually small-5 to 10 bags each. (H. 110, 146) Said defendant company
has also moved some truckload shipments from \Vest
.Jordan to Security Warehouse in Salt Lake and to candy
companies. (R. 147) rr'hese shipments occurred only during the peak season, which is the canning season. (R. 147)
Said defendant is able to handle all peak sugar movements
(R. 150) and if the movement of more than 1,000 bags a
day is required, said defendant is in a position to buy
more trucks or rent trucks to take care of the emergency.
(R. 151)
The Utah-Idaho Nugar Company offered no criticism
ti

of the handling of its shipments by the defendant company, nor did it make any criticism of its automotive
equipment. (R. 106) The service rendered it by defendant
company has been very satisfactory. (R. 106) It supported plaintiffs' application for a contract carrier permit because it desired speedy service rather than "emergency" service. (R. 103, 107) The defendant company
has never refused the Sugar Company common carrie~·
service. (R. 103)
The plaintiffs prior to the filing of their application
for a contract carrier's permit in the instant case had
served Utah-Idaho Sugar Company under a "purported
oral agreement". (R. 70, 71, 73, 75; 92, 102) They
rendered such service without any formal authority from
the Public Service Commission. (R. 84)
The following colloquy between Mr. Donald Hacking,
Chairman of the Public Service Commission of Utah,
and Mr. Elmer L. Sims, a witness for the plaintiffs, is
pertinent:
"CoM. HAcKING: As I understand your testimony, you have rendered this service to the UtahIdaho Sugar Company at We::;t .Jordan for ::;orne
consi(lerahle period of time?
A. Yes.
CoM. l:IACKING: An<l are still rendering it. As
you stated, yon sent a truc·k out yesterday '1
A. Yes.
CoM. HACKING: Now, under what claim or
authority have you been rendering this servicE\
since the effective day of the 194-5 Amendment to
the Motor Carrier Act, excluding from the ('Xemp-
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tion the eontraet hauls iifteeu mlles beyond the
city limits'!
A. Well, I thought that we automatically had
the right to continue doing the type of business
we were prior to 1945; that if we were operating
as a contract carrier permit prior to that time, wu
could continue to operate.
CoM. HACKING: That is, you had the view that
you would have that authority automaCcally,
without any specific written authority from this
Commission~

A. I thought we could continue it, see.
<..;oM. HAcKDrG: Has the Commission, through
its enforrement department, questioned that authority and che<'ked yon on that?
A. They have nevPr questioned us on this
\\'est .Jordan haul. I heliev<' the Commission has
known for quite a period of time, we were hauling
this sugar. As a matter of faet, I filed a contract
with you. No one seem:,; to be ahle to find it, but,
if l remember correctly, I filed the contract with
the Commission ahnost a ypar ago.
CoM. HACKING: Isn't it a fact, Elmer, that
yon have procured temporary authorities from
time to time in some of these ea:,;es, where there
has heen a hig movenH•nt of sup;ar, to make the
haul?
A. Yes sir, we have. From Ogden and Lehi.
CoM. HACKING: Have yon P\'er from West
.To rda n '?
A. I don't believe so." (R. 84, 85)
Also, the following part of the testimony of Mr.
George A. Sims, a witness on behalf of plaintiffs, given
on direct examination is extremely rel<•vant:

"Q. Mr. Sims, this is an application relative
to a contract carrier authority to operate for and
on behalf of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company between West Jordan and Salt Lake City. Will
you state how long you have l~ngaged in that
type of operation'?
A. Well, we have been hauling for the Sugar
Company haek as far as 1 can remember, and
that would lw in '85, 1935. And we have produced
evidence at our !waring when we applied for our
rightR, and the Commission said we were not only
common carriers for rertain article!', but we were
a contract carrier and we were givPn the rights
to be a contract carrier at that time.
Q. Directing your attention to the year 1940,
were you, during 1940 and prior thereto, engaged
as a contract carrier, by verbal contract, with the
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company in transporting their
commodities between West Jordan and Salt Lake~
A. Yes; we made an agreement with them
to haulMR. RITER: I am going to object to that question, and I am doing it for the purpose of the
record here. • * *
CoM. HAcKING: The objection will he overruled.
MR. PuGSLEY: You may answer.
'I' HE vVITNESS: Repeat that question:
(Question read.)
A. Yes sir, and since that time.
Q (By Mr. Pugsley). Since that time have
you served them under this oral arrangement,
from time to tinw?
A. Yes, when ever they nPf~rlPu us." ( R. 65,
66, 67)
9

~Ir.

UeorgP A. Sint~
1ion in part a;;; l"ollo\\·;;;:

al~o t~~~tified 011

ero;;;;;;-examina-

"Q. \\'pJl now, you

Ul'<'d a clau;,;e here on a
that interested me very much, in testil'ying as to yom ~ervice to the Utah-Idaho Sugar
Company. You :mid, '\Vhene\'Pl' they needed it'.
~tatement,

As a matter of faet, your practice has been
that when thP Sugar Company called up you
l"PSpondPd with Ollf~ 0 j' your trw~ks, didn't yon?
A. Y(•s

~ir.

0. And you made your arrangement then and
there as to what the rate would be?
A. 'l'hey already had our price we were workmg for.
Q.

You had discussed the prices, what you

\\'<•rP \\'orking for, fil'P\'iously1

A.

()]J

yP:-:.

(~. But so l'n r a;;; tl1P imnwdiatv anangement
went, it was principally by telephone, I assume'?

A.

AttN

\\'itll tht>Jll,

,\'Pi'

till~

first arrangement was

mad·~

:-:ir.

Q. \V!'ll, what do you mr:an b)' 'an oral agrec•', tlJPII!

llH~nl

A. By an oral agn~emenl is when' yon go
:-;ee a firm, and thPy ask yon what you would haul
---how ntueh a hnndred pounds )'OU would haul
l'r0111 a <'(•rtain pni11t to a c-<,rtain point, ba:-:ed on
a quantii)r or :-;o muelt.
Q. Well, Mr. Sims, \\'h(•n yon examined tlw
record in your cas(~---)'Oll J'l'(~aH your case that
made a lot of law for us, that went to the Ruprenw
Court'!
10

A. Yes, it went to the Supreme Court twice.
Q. Yes, it went to the Supreme Court twice,
and when you examined the Public Service Commission's record in that case, you recall-when
the permit as contract carrier was issued to you
there was six different firms specified you would
serve?

A. Yes, sir, but I was given the impression
that all that was necessary after we were given
the rights of a contract carrier, all we would
have to do was file another contract, and it would
automatically go into effect. rrhat was the understanding of why they gave us this as a contract
carrier.
Q. All right. Yon could read the orders of the
Commission in that respect, couldn't you?

A. Yes sir.
Q. And you know that-what those orders
specified, didn't you-in detail the Commission
pursued that matter, and very carefully enumerated the concerns for which you could carry as
contract carried

MR. PuGsLEY: \V ell, just one moment. I object
i o this as calling for a legal conclusion, and, furtlH~r, the fact that the Commission will take judicial notice of the fact that this sugar factory is
within the fifteen-mile zone which was exempt
at the time this former order was issued. ~, 'x *

CoM.
rnled.

lTAcin~<::

rPhe objection will

bf~

over-

A. I thought I knew, but the thing has b<~<'n
twisted around now so T don't know wlwn~ T am at.
11

(,~. \V ell, Mr. ::-;ims, as a matter of fairness
to you, would you like to see the copy of the
arnPnded order of the Commission on the 23nl
of February, l 939, in Case 1849 '? * * *
A. lt is emw No. 1849. Yes, I have read it.

Q. (By Mr. Riter): You don't notice the
name of the Utah-Idaho Sugar in there, do yon'?
A. No sir.

Q. ·were you hauling for the Utah-Idaho
Sugar at that time?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Do yon want to go haek there and read
the whole opinion of the Commi:-;sion on there,
where they define the difference between the contract earriers and eommon earriers?
A. T think I know.
Q. You think you knoV.' that'?

"\. Right.
Q. Then you recall what the Commission told
you at that time was the exact difference between
the two, and they definPd it 1

A. [ think 1 could defme it.
Q. My point is this, after that extensive litig;:ttion which yon took to the Supreme Court
twiee, and after these elaborate proceedings befon' the Public Serviee Commission, all of which
you WPn• informed of because you paid for, of
conr·se-now I want to kno\Y why, in face of that,
did .\'Oll ignore this Utah-Idaho Sugar situation?

:\lR. PuusLEY: T objeet to that, as no evidence
in the reeord he haR ignored the Utah-Idaho
situation at all.

MR. RITER: Perhaps the best way right now
1s to withdraw.
I expected Mr. Pugsley would introduce into
this hearing these basic proceedings that enter
relevantly into any consideration of this. Are
you going to introduce them in evidence7
MR. PuGSLEY: I am not.
MR. RITER: Will you take judicial notice of• it?
CoM. HACKING: Mr. Riter, is West Jordan
within fifteen miles of Salt Lake City limits?
MR. RITER: Yes, it is.
MR. PuGSLEY: Yes sir.
CoM. HACKING: Well, at that time the Salt
Lake Transfer could have served West Jordan
without any authority.
MR. RITER: Under the old law.
CoM. HACKING: Under the old law.
Mn. PuGSLEY: That's right.
CoM. HACKING: That is, at the time this report
and order was made and issued by the Commission, there was no particular need to consider the
\Vest .Jordan movement, was there?
~ln. RlTErr: Ex(~ept this, that this ·whole matter of thPir contract earrier status vvas being
considered by the Commission, and Mr. Sims has
testifiPd that at that time they wen~ serving UtahIdaho Sugar Company, and what I want to know
is why, in view of these plenary proceedings that
were before this Commission and beforr tlw
Supreme Court, why at that time thii'i Utah-Idaho
Sugar situation wasn't brought to the attPntion
of the Commission J
CoM. l-L'\CKING: Can yon answer that, Mr.
Sims 'f

13

"\. Yes sir. Th(~I'P was a <·lausP in the Jmy
that we wPre orwrating- undPr then that we had <l
right to take eare of int(~l'llrhan delivery of g'PilPI'al f'Ommodities anywhen' within a radius oJ'
fifteen miles of the eity limits, and that wasn't
only for one finn, but that was a Stah~-wid,•
Pxemption, so that a man living in the countr:f
eould deliver something- ovPr tift<~ell miles to ;i
llPighbor in town, and like\visP, lwn•, and WP
operated nndPJ' that. f helped put the <'lanse in.''
(R. 70-7G)

The plaintiffs are the owners and holders of CPrtiiieate
of Convenience aml Nt>ceBsity No. 012 dated .January Hl,
1939. (R. 119, 135) This Certificate rwrmits them to trailsport in intra-state connnerce commodities \Vhich by reason o[ tlwir size, shape, weight, origin or destination
requin; speeial equipmPnt or :-i<'rYi<'e ot' a eharaeter rwt
regularly furnished by eommon carriers at regular Jim~
rates; commodities in connection with the transportation
of which is rendered a special serviee in preparing such
commodities for shipment or setting up after delivery,
or otherwise rendering a ;service not a part of ordinary
aet of tnw:-;portation, and not regularly furnished by
other common carriers; and camp site equipment. (R. 135,
137) Plaintiffs are also the holders of contract t~arrier
permit No. 212 (amended) dated February 23, 193}1,
issued in Case ~ o. 1849 (R. 73, 125, 12f.i, 132) wherein
the plaintiffs are authorizPd to transport certain specified pnlperty for six idtmtified eonLractees (none of whom
u as tl1 e U tal1-f ifalw 8uga1· Co Jn)Wf!J/) over several separate routes in the State of Utah. (R 73, 75)

14

ARGUMENT

I.
THE PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED
AS A MATTER OF RIGHT TO A CONTRACT
CARRIER PERMIT UNDER THE SO-CALLED
"GRANDFATHER" RIGHT AS PROVIDED BY
SECTION 76-5-21, UTAH CODE 1943, AS AMENDED BY LAWS OF UTAH 1945, CHAPTER 105,
SECTION 3, PAGE 209.

Section 76-5-21 Utah Code 1943, as amended by Laws
of Utah, 1945, Chapter 105, Section 3, Page 209, was
operative on the date of the application of plaintiffs for
a contract carrier pPrmit. The present statute reads as
follows:
76-3-21.

"It shall be unlavvful for any contract nwtor
carrier to operate as a carrier in intrastate commerce without having first obtained from the
commission a permit therefor. The Commission
shall grant on application to any applicant who
was a contract motor carrier as defined by this
act on the 1st day of January, 1940, a permit to
operate as a contract motor carrier on the saml'highways and to carry on the same type of motor
service as he was on said date.

"The commission upon the filing of an application for a contract motor carrier's penr1it shall
fix a time and place for hearing thereon and may
give the same notice as provided in section 76-5-18
hereof. If, from aU the testimony offered at said
hearing, the commission shall determine that the
highways over which the applicant desires to
operate are not unduly burdened; that the granting of the application will not unduly interfen:
with the traveling public; and that the granting
15

of Uw appLication will not be detrimental to the
best interests of the people of the state of Utah
and/ or to the localities to be served, and if the
existing transportation facilities do not provide
adequate or rmtsonable serviee, tlw commission
shall grant such permit.''
'!'he plaintiffs assign as error the action of the Commission in refusing to grant plaintiffs a contract carrier
permit to haul sugar between \Vest Jordan and Salt Lab~
City, Utah, for tlw Ctah-Idaho Sugar Company. l<'undamentally, this daim of error it> hat->ed upon tltn purported
''grandfather'' dause eontained in the abovp quoted
statute, and n~ading at-> follows:
'' 'l'ht• eonunission :,;hall grant on applieation
to any applieant who was a contract motor carrier
as dt>fined by thi:,; ad on thn h:t day of January,
1940, a IH:'l'Hiit to operat(~ as a eontract motor carri<>r en thP sHill(' highways and to carry on the
snmP typP ol' motor service as he was on said
date."
Ac·cording to plaintiffs' contention, this permit should
have issued to the plaintiffs as a matter of right upon
their showing that on the 1st day of January, 1940, they
were operating as a contract carrier for the Utah-Idaho
Sugar Company on the public highway between \V e:st
,Jordan and Salt Lake City, Utah.
'I'he irnmediat(• aHtecedent of the present statute is
Section 9 of Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, which reads
in pertinent part as follows:

Hit shall be unlawful for any contract motor
carrier to operate as a carrier in trastate commerce without having first ohtail1f~d from the com16

mission a permit therefor. The commission shall
grant on application to any applicant who was a
contract motor carrier as defined by this act on
the fifteenth day of March, 1933, a permit to
operate as a contract motor carrier on the same
highways and to carry on the same type of motor
service as he was prior to said date. Where said
applicants were operating on all the highways
of the state prior to said date, the permit shall
authorize them to continue to operate on all of
said highways. The commission shall furthermore grant on application to any applicant who
received a permit to operate as a. contract motor
carrier between the fifteenth day of March, 1933,
and the date on which this act takes effect, a
permit to continue to operate in the same manner
and over the same highways as the terms of said
permit allowed.
"The commission upon the filing of an application for a contract motor carrier's permit by any
other person than those referred to above in this
section shall fix a time and place for hearing thereon and shall give the same notice as provided in
section 6 hereof. * * * If, from all the testimony
offered at said hearing, the commission shall
determine that the highways over which the applicant desires to operate are not unduly burdened:
that the granting of the application will not unduly
interfere with the traveling public; and that the
granting of the application will not be detrimental
to the best interests of the people of the state
of Utah and/ or to the localities to be served, tlw
commission shall grant such permit; "' * "'''
(Italics supplied)
A comparison of the law under which plaintiffs made
their application on November 10, 1947, with the relevant
17

ihe 19::;5 statuU• [a~;f; abovP ljUOted, dearly
shows that the Legislaiur<', in pl'O\'idiHg for tlw "grandfather" rights, intended to modi(v in a radical manner
the provisions of the prior law. In order to understand
this ehange, it is lH'CCssary to ref(~r to the case of 111 c('arthy 1:. P1tblic Service Commission of Utah, 94 Ut.
:~04, 77 Pac. 2d 331. 'l'his decision, in interpreting Seetion 9 of Chapter Gfi, T. . aws of Vtah, H)35, took note of
the fact that the statute made no provision for notice
and hearing in tlw granting of <~ontract carrier permits
under the "grandfather" clause, hut that the application
for snrh permit by an:· other contract motor carrier, viz.
nP\\'-comer's in th(~ eontract motor bw.;iness, should be
snt for hearing at a titllP and plaee fixed hy the Commission, and notieP lw giv<m to all advPnwly intereste<l
in the same. 'l'h<• "grandfather" <'lanse of this statutt'
fanJred two classes: (a) thosp vdw WPJ'e eontract earriPrs as defined b:v· Ht<> aet nn Mareh 15, 1933, and (b)
those who reeeiV('d a rwrmit as contraet carrier after
1\farch 15, 1933 and Jwl'ore the> (•ffeetive date of Chapt<u·
G5 (Deeemlwr 31, 1935). 'l'h<> Court, however, spr~cifically
declined t<\ tweept the literal reading of the ~tatute,
m;iug this languagr·:
]Jl'O\'lSlOllS

oJ'

''But it \Vas never intended by the Legislature
that these permits issued un~der the act to existing
oi· antecedent contract carriers without a hearing
or notice to others, should be conclusive and binding determinations of the right of such permittt'.e::;
to operate thereunder, or to perform any other or
different service than specified therein or even the
class of service therein stated. In the nature of
the case, such permits can only operate as prima
lS

facie evidence of the right of the permittee to
operate thereunder. Least of all, can it be properly said that such a permit, issued upon application, excludes the right of a competitor to contend
and to show to the Commission by protest, objection, or otherwise that the permittee in his operations thereunder has exceeded the limits or
character of service permitted thereby, and has
entered into regular competition with-let us say
-common motor carriers; that the permittee is
holding himself out to the public as equipped,
ready, and willing to accept loads wherever and by
whomsoever tendered; or that he has provided
himself with equipment for use in hauling loads
that unduly injure the highway, the public, and all
competitors; or that he is hauling regularly over
highways not specified in his permit. These and
many like subjects of inquiry might be suggested.
In any such case it would be the Commission's
duty to receive and file the complaints or objections made and to order a hearing to determine
the truth of the matter, notwithstanding that a
permit had already issued to the contract carrier
in question. This is not unfair to the latter,
for, had the permittee desired a permit or a
certificate of necessity that would be conclusive
and binding upon all comers, he had it in his
power to request a hearing of the Commission
and notice to all adversely concerned before tlw
issuance or acceptance of the permit. Upon constitutional principles the applicant eannot expect
a conclusive or binding determination upon an
ex parte application. Least of all, can he expeet
that persons adversely affected by his application
shall be held bound or affected by mere selfserving declarations or statements contained in
his application for a permit." ( pp. 33G-337 of
i7 Pac. 2d)
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As the 1"fcCarthy case, supra, points out, a distinction was made by the statute between applicants comin~
mHler thP ''grandfather'' clause and those who applied
for a permit who WPn' not within the preferred classe2.
Plaintiff:-:' argnmPnt wonlcl find weight had the 1935
statute bPc~n in orwration at t!w time their application
with whieh the Court i::; now concemed was filed.
When refPrence i::; made to Section 76-5-21 Utah
Code 1943, as amended by Laws of Utah 1945, it will be
seen that the Legislature radically changed the practice
in this regard. rrhe statute, after providing that a contract motor c-arrier on the first da)' of ,January, 1940,
should he granted a permit, directs:
'' 1'he Commission upon the filing of an application for a contract motor carrier's permit shall
fix a time and place for hearing thereon and may
give the same notice as provided in Section
76-5-18 hereof. If, from all the testimony offered
at said hearing, the commission shall determine
that the highways over which the applicant desires
to operate are not unduly burdened; that the
granting of the applic-ation will not unduly interfere with the traveling public; and that the granting of the application will not be detrimental to
the best interests of the peopJp of the state of
lJtah and/or to the localities to be served, and
if the existing transportation facilities do not pro. \'ide a(lequatf' or reasonable service, the comlllission shall gra11t Sll('h permit."
( \m1pare thP eorrrlative provisions of Chapter 65, Laws
ol' Utah 19:1;5, whid1read:
• • 'I' he ('OJmnis;.;ion, upon the filing of an applic-ation fo1· a eontraet motor carrier's permit by
;.!I)

any other person than those referred to above,
etc.," (Italics supplied)
with the provisions of Section 76-5-21 Utah Code 194;),
as amended by the La_ws of Utah of 1945, and it will be
thus seen that in the 1945 act the legislature purposely
eliminated the phrase "by any other person than those
referred to above in this section," and added the words
''and if the existing transportation facilities do not provide adequate or reasonable service.'' 'l'his change in
phraseology clearly expresses an intent on the part of
the legislature that the practice of granting ''grandfather" permits without notice would thereafter be eliminated, and that all applications, whether under the
"grandfather" preference or without the preference,
should be set for hearing, and notice thereof should be
given to interested parties. The McCarthy decision,
supra, was announced on March 12, 1938. It undoubtedly
influenced the form of the 1945 amendment.
It is manifest that the Court is now required to construe Section 76-5-21 Utah Code 1943, as amended by
Laws of Utah 1945, inasmuch as there exists on the face
of the statute an apparent contradiction. By the first
paragraph, the Commission is directed to grant on application to any applicant who was a contract motor
carrier as defined by the act on January 1, 1940, a permit to operate as a contract motor carrier on the same
highways and to carry on the same type of motor serviee
as he was on said date. By the second paragraph ol'
said section, the Commission is directed upon the filing
of an application for a contract motor carrier's permit
21

to li:--; a t imP and phH·e o\' lwaring th<·reon, and to glV<~
notiee then•of. It may UKe tlw method of notice provided
in Sertion 76-5-18 Ftah Code 1943. Hovvcver, notic<~ iu
wme form must lw ginn. It is th<~n provided that if the
Commission ;,:hall deterlllillP "from all thP tPstimony of-

fen'd at ~aid hearing" that four enumerated conditions
arP sho\vn to Pxist, that a permit shall issue. A literal
reading of this ~tatute produces confusion and contradiction. 'l'hp ::-;ection, after directing that an applicant who
was a contraet motor eanier on ,January 1, 1940, shall receive a rwrmit to op(~ratc as ::-;ueh motor earrier, then provides that the Commission ~:;hall hold a hearing after
notice, and receive evidence, and if sueh evidence meets
the conditions named, it shall grant a permit. If the construction is adopted such as the literal rrading of the statute suggests, then the "grandfath0r" elause is wholly
destroyed. lt is not lJcLievecl that ~:mch construction or
interpretation of the statute would carry out the legislative intent. Therefore, the task devolves upon the Court
to discover, if possible, a construction of the statute which
will give full weight to all its parts, eliminate absurdities,
and at the same time express the legislative intent.
The following rules for statutory construction ar"
a pplieable:
"In the interpretation of a statute, the lt>gi-:lature will be presumed to have insl'rted every
part thereof for a purpose, and to haYP intended
that every part of a statute should lw earrie,l
into effect. The maxim, 'ut res magi:-:, qnaw
pereat,' rectnires not merely that a statut<' Hhould
be given effeet as a \i,hore, but that 0ffeet should
given tu ea('h of its express provisions. A

be·

:2'!

statute should not be construed in such manner
as to render it partly ineffective or inefficient if
another construction \vill make it effective. Indeed, it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction
that significance and effect should, if possible,
without destroying the sense or effect of the law,
be accorded every part of the act, including every
Rection, paragraph, sentence, clause, phrase, and
word. Under this rule, that construction i;-;
favored which will render every word operative,
rather than one which makes some words idle
and nugatory. Sometimes, however, it is not
possible, in arriving at the meaning of statutes,
to give force and effect to every word and phra~e
used. The court may not, in order to give effect
to particular words, virtually destroy the meaning of the entire context, that is, give them ~
significance which would be clearly repugnant to
the statute looked at as a whole and destructive
of its obvious intent. It has also been declared
that if a word is used unnecessarily in one part
of a statute, it may well be regarded as so used
in another." (50 Am. Jur., Sec. 358, pp. 361-364.)
"It is a general rule of interpretation that
statutes should, if possible, be so construed as to
make them practicable. Hence, a construction of
an ambiguous statute should be avoided, which
would render the application of the statute impracticable, or which would require the performance of a vain, idle, or futile thing, or attempt to
require the performance of an impossible act.
Indeed, a statute will not be construed so as to
require the performance of an impossible act, if
any other construction can be legitimately given
it. There are some statutes, however, the utility
of which may not be considered. The courts can
only interpret a Rtatute aR framPd, nohvithstancl-

ing diliitulties in its application." (50 Am. Jttr.,
Sec . .16'0, p. 36'5.)
'' Consisteney in statutes is of prime Imporand in the absence of a showing to the
eontrary, all laws an• presumed to be consistent
with Paeh other. ~Where it is possible to do so,
it is the duty of the courts, in the construetion
ol' statutes, to harmonize and ref~onrile lavYs, and
to adopt that construction of a statutory provision
whieh harmonizes and reconciles it with other
statutory provisions. A <~onstruction of a :,.;tatute
whieh creates an inconsistency should be avoided
"·hen a reasonable intl~rpretation can b<~ a<lopted
vdtich will not do violence to the plain worcb of
tlw ad aml will earry out tllP intention of CongTPss. '' '' * In order that effeet may be given
to every part of an act in accordance with tho
legislative intent, all the language of the act
must be brought into a<~eord. 'l'he various provisiom; of an aet shonld be rPad so that all may,
if possible, have their due and conjoint effect
witlwnt n'rmgnaney or inconsistency, so as to
retHle r t lw sta 1nt(~ a eonsisten t and harmonious
whole. Hr>nee, "·lwre two constructions of a
statute are possible, by one of which the entirt~
aet may he~ harmonious while the ather will
create disconl between different provisions, the
former should he adopted. Although the courts
eannot add to, take from, or change the language
of a statute to give effed to any supposed intention of the legislutun~, words and phrases may
bf~ altered aml supl;lied when that is necessary
to obviate n~pugnane;: and inconsistency and to
give effect to the manifest intention of the legislature. The legislative intention will prevail over
thP litf'ra! import of particular terms, and will
control the striet letter of the statute, where an
tam~e,
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adherence to such strict letter would lead to
contradictory provisions. * * * " (.50 Am. Jur.,

Sec. /36'3, pp ..'167-86'9.)
''Particular statutory provisions may present
;-;nell an inconsistency as cannot be harmonized
or reconeilecl. H is obvious that effect cannot
he given to all the provisions of a statute where
some of them are inconsistent and irreconcilable.
In such case, as in other cases, a construction is
sought \\'hirh would give effec-t to the purpose ot'
the statutP and the intention of the legislatur<>.
·~

* *"

(:W

Am. Jnr., Sec .

.'J(i4,

pp . .'W.4-.'J70.)

'' l t is a ('ardinal rnle of con::;truetion that
;;;ignifiean<·e and effe(·t shall, if possible. be ac<·onled to every sedion, elause, word or part ol'
the aet." {,?5 R.C.L. 1004.}

·'The SP\'<'ral provisions of the statnte should
IH• ('Onstrued togeillPr in th<• light of the general
purpm:p and ohjPet of Ht<> aet and so as to give

dfeet to tlw main intPnt and purpose of thP
lt-gislatun• as tlH·rein t>xpr·es;;;e(l."

(25 R.C./1.

J()()f'.)

'' .\n interpretation whieh defeats any of thP
m:mi t'Pst pnrposes of the statute eannot he ae<·<>pt<'d." (:26 R.C.L. 1014.}

ll sing these well e:,;tahlii:ilwd rules of eonstruetion
as a basi:,; for ddPrruining the legislative intent in amending in 194;), N(•dion /fi-5-21, Utah Code 1943 to its presei1t
form, it ii'l sPen that the legislature
had in mind the de<'i. '
sion of the Supreme Court in the McCarthy ease stlpr.-a~

.

and that it intended to codify the rule of that case by 1'<.'quiring that all applications for contract carrier's permits
should be granted only after hearing, whereof notice had
been given. rrlt.is purpose is clearly shown Ly the elirni-

nation of the phrase ''by any other person than those
referred to above in this section", which was contained
in the 1935 act (Sec. 9, Chapt. 65, Laws of Utah 1935 ).
As to practice and procedure, the legislature made no
distinction between those entitled to permits under the
"grandfather" clause and late comers, but required in
all cases that the permit be granted only after hearing·
upon notice. With this purpose definitely ascertained,
the task remains to discover a construction which will
maintain the integrity of this legislative purpose, and
at the same time reconcile the ''grandfather'' clause
with the second paragraph of the section. In this connection, the excerpt from the McCarthy opinion above
quoted is pertinent, and particularly the statement:
"In the nature of the case, such permits
[meaning permits issued without notice or hearing] can only operate as prima facie evidence of
the right of the permittee to operate thereunder.
Least of all, can it be properly said that such a
permit, issued upon application, excludes the
right of a competitor to contend and to show to
the Commission * * * that the permittee in his
operations * * * has entered into regular competition with-let us say-common motor carriers
* * *" (Italics supplied)
That declaration suggests strongly a construction and
interpretation of the statute which will attain the main
objective of the legislature and at the same time make
effective all provisions of the statute. It is believed, and
it is hereby earnestly urged, that a reasonable meaning
of the statute may be deduced as follows:
(a) That all applications for a contract carrier's

carrier's permit, whether by pl.'ef,erred persons
2(i

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

under the "grandfather" clause or by late
comers into the tmnsportation field, must be
set for hearing upon a date certain, and notice
of the hearing be given;
That no contract carrier's permit shall issue
until after a hearing in which persons adv,ersely
affected may appear and submit evidence on
their behalf, and cross-examine opposing witnesses;
In the event there is a "full dress'' hearing held
after interested parties have appeared in opposition, the Commission must, from the evidence,
find the four conditions existing as set forth
in the second paragraph of the statute before
a permit may issue;
In determining the existence of such conditions,
proof that the applicant is a preferred person
under the "grandfather" clause will prima facie
establish his right to a permit, and cast the
burden of going forward with the proof upon
his opponents to disestablish this prima facie
right, the burden of proof remaining, however,
in toto upon the applicant to establish the four
conditions named in the statute.
If after the Commission has set the application
for hearing upon a date certain and has given
notice, no interested persons appear in opposition to the granting of the permit, proof that
the applicant is a preferred person under the
"grandfather" clause will ,entitle him to a permit.

Under the foregoing construction, the "grandfather"
elanse, in view of the 1945 amendment, does not confer
upon an applicant a :;;uhRtantive right, hnt rather a proeednral advantagE~. This procedural advantage is not a
mere shadow Ol' chimera, hut is a p-roeess of vahw to an
applic·ant in sr>rking a permit. It is an advantage well
known to lr~p;nl pro<•edurP.~'
''As an example, Section 8 0-12-4 Utah Code 1 9 43 provide~ that
a transfer of a material part of a decedent's estate in the nature of
a final distribution thereof, made by a decedent within thrPe year,;

It is earnestly contended by the defendants that the
foregoing construction and interpretation of this statute complies with recognized rules of statutory construction; perpetuates the intention of the legislature;
does no violence to the rights of the parties interested,
but rather preserves the same and recognizes due procP-ss
procedure, so strongly implied in the McCarthy decision,
supra.
A review of the record in this case reveals that tlH~
Commission recognized both the rule of thP McOartll,iJ
decision and the mandates of the 1945 act. The plaintiffs' application was set for hearing upon a date eertain, and all interested persons notified. The defendant
carrier appeared in response to said notice, and contested the application. The plaintiff primarily rested
its case (mistakenly, we believe) upon its "grandfather"
rights, as it does in these review proceedings. Substantial evidence was submitted which enabled the Commission to make definite findings: (a) that the applicant
had failed to show that existing transportation facilitie:-:;
did not provide adequate or reasonable service, as required by Section 76-5-21, as amended; (b) that tl11:
granting of the permit would d~tract from the business
of the existing carriers, which would eventually impair
rather than improve transportation service in the area
proposed to be served; (c) that the defendant carrier
is ready, ahle, and willing to render reasonable, adequatl~
prior to his death except a bona fide sale for a fair consideration,
"shall be presumed to have been made in contemplation of death."
Any lawyer is well aware of the. difficulties of overcoming this
presumption or prima facie case in opposition to the tax authorities'
purpose to tax such transfer.

sennce to the

an~a

·and the :-;hipper

coven~d

by tlw ap-

plieation; (d) that suffieient serviee is already availablt•
in the an~a proposed to lw served by the applicant; and
(e) that the granting of the applieation would be detrimental to th<· !Jest inten•sts of the people iu the area
<'OYered by tlw applieation.

In view of the foregoing, it is

submittt~d

that plaintiffs' <~onteution thai it was automati<·ally entitled to a
euu traet earrier 's permit in the instant ease by virtue
of preferred rights conferred upon it by the "grandfathPr" elanse, is without merit.

H.
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE
BENEFIT OF THE "GRANDFATHER" RIGHTS
UNDER SECTION 76-5-21, UTAH CODE 194;J,AS
AMENDED BY CHAP'l'ER 105, LAWS OF UTAH
1945, BECAUSE (1) THEY WERE NOT A CONTRACT CARRIER ON JANUARY 1, 1940 AND
(2) 'l'HEY ILLEGALLY TRANSPORTED SUGAR
OVER PUBLIC HIGHWWAYS FORUTAH~IDAHO
SUGAR COMPANY FROM WEST JORDAN, UTAH,
TO SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, DURING THE
PERIOD FROM MAY 8, 1945, TO THE DATE OF
HEARING BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION IN THIS MATTER.
l•~n·n

St~etion

/fi;J-:21, Utah Code 1!)4;), as amend<•d hy Chapt<·r 10;), La\\':-:
oJ' {r(a!J 104:J, lw adopted, tiH• P\·idP!l('(' ill thi:-: ea.;e
[H"o\·<'s thai tlwy \\"Pre orwrating on January 1, 1940
under tltP "1 G mile" exemption and also that they had
f 0 rtei t11d their right to elaim pri vil<•g<'S under tJt,~
"gran<lfatbPr" elause o l' the statute. The• testin1m1y
of Oemgc A. Sim:-; anJ ElinP r A. Sims, wi tnPsse:-'
though plaintiffs' eonstrudion of

on behalf of plaintiffs at the hearing before the
Commission, hereinbefore set forth in the defendant
carrier's supplemental statement of facts, abundantly
demonstrates that the plaintiffs transported sugar for
the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company upon the public highways of Utah between the .West Jordan plant of the
Sugar Company and Salt Lake City, Utah, during the
period commencing May 8, 1945 and up to the date oi
hearing before the Commission. Their testimony also
shows without contradiction that the plaintiffs did not
secure from the Commission a contract carrier's permit
to cover this transportation.
Chapter 105, Laws of Ut3:h 1945, also amended Section 76-5-25 Utah Code 1943 by striking therefrom these
two exemptions from the operation of the Motor Carrier::;
Act:
(a) "To contract motor carriers of property
when operating wholly within the limits of an incorporated city or town and for a distance of not
exceeding fifteen road miles beyond the corporate
limits of the city or town in Utah in which the
point of origin of any property or passenger
movement is located or when operated within a
radius of 15 miles from any point of origin outside of an incorporated city or town in Utah, and
which movement either alone or in conjunction
with another vehicle or vehicles is not a part of
any journey or haul beyond said fifteen-mile
limit;''
(i) "To the casual or occa::;ional transportation
of persons or property for compensation by any
person not regnlarly engaged in transportation

by lllotor vel!ieleB as his or its principal occupatioll or husine:;;s."

'The legal result of the repeal of the "15 mile" exemption formerly eontained in the 1935 act (Section 76-5-25
['talt Code 1943) is described by Mr. Justice Latimer in
t!Jp prevailing opinion in Rowley v. Public Sen:ice Cornmission of Utah, ______ Utah, ______ , 183 Pae. (2<1) 514, at 51~)
as follows:
''The effeet of these latter amendments was
to bring under the control of the commission all
(jarriers openfting within cities and towns and
f'or a (listanee of not to exceed 15 miles beyond
the l'Orporat<> limits, and also to the casual or
oeea:;;ional opPrator who was opnrating but whose
prineipnl lnu-;inPs:;; was not trau:-:portation."
When Commit--:sioner Hacking interrogated both 1\lr·.
L. Sim:;; and Mr. GeorgP A. Rims, witnesses for
plaintiffs. ht- partieularly directed his questions as to
the plaintiffs' eonduet of their business alter the effective date (.\lay 8, 194G) of Chapter lOG Laws of Utah
1945, amending- Sections 76-5-21 and 76-5-25 Utah Codu
1943. Both of thl'SP witn<'sses gave rPsponses that indieated definitely that the plaintiffs had been using thP
public hig-!J ways l'o I' tra llS porta tion o J' sugar for the
lJtah-Idaho Sugar Company during said period withour
securing- an~- eontrad eanier',: rwnnit therefol'. .1\11'.
(}eorge A. Sirm;' testimon~· further indicates _that _the
plaintiffs had prior to May 8, 1945, hauled the sugar
nnder the "15 mile" pxemption contained in sub-paragraph (a) of Section 7G-5-25 Utah Code• 1943 before it
\Vas eliminated by the 1945 amendment. There is absoI<~lmer
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1i
lutely no evidence in the record that on January 1, 1940,
or at any other time, the plaintiffs had obtained a contract carrier's permit to handle sugar for the UtahIdaho Sugar Company. Conversely, the evidence shows
without contradiction that the plaintiffs transported
this sugar under the "15 mile" exemption, and that
when that exemption was repealed on May 8, 1945, they
did not make any effort to secure a contract carrier's
permit. Rather, they continued operations without authority, and speciously explained such conduct at the
hearing by stating they believe<! they had authority
automatically to continue such service without specific
written authority from the Commission. (R. 84)
The evidence shows that plaintiffs were the holder
of Contract Carrier Permit No. 212, as amended) datcJ
February 23, 1939, issued in Case No. 1849 (R. 73, 125,
126, 132) wherein the plaintiffs were authorized to transport certain specific property for six identified contractees (none of which was the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company) over several separate routes in the State of Utah.
(R. 73, 75) There is no evidence that the plaintiffs were
ever granted a "general contract carrier permit" such
as suggested by Mr. Justice Wolfe in his concurring
opinion in the McCarthy case, supra. (P. 226 of 184
Pac. 2d) The evidence in fact shows that the plaintiffs
had been granted permits covering services to be rendered to six contractees over defined route:;;, none of
which was the vVest ,Jordan-Salt Lake City route. Prior
to the 1945 amendment, the plaintiffs had operated under
the "15 mile" exemption, but upon the removal of this
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exemption from Lhe law, the plaintiffs aulomatically
eame under the rontrol of the Comission, and it was
Uwir duly to apply at onee to the Commission for a
<'Ontract earrier's permit eovcriug the transportation
of sugar for the Utah-Idaho Sugar Compauy. 'l'he faillHP or refusal of plaintiffs to :,;eenre this permit ma(k
their transportation o I' sugar O\'P r publie h iglrways an
illl•gal operation, and ln·ings it squarely \\·ithin thP rulP
of the Rowley easP.
SPr·tion /li-S-:21 l'tah ('odp HJ4:~, as atnt>ndl•d h,\'
Chaptut· J()f) Laws of l'iah Hl4S, dPnoun('PS as unlawful
th<' ad of an;· <"ontrad lllotor ea rrin in opPrating as
stwh I'HtTier in intrastatP <·omtnen·<· withtHtt first having
olliaim~d

fi'Om tll<~ Commis:-;ion a rwnnit thPrPfor. "\l't<>r
tl)(' n•rwal ot' thf~ ")f) mile" PX(·tuplion ou ~lay H, 1943,
til<• plaintiffR in tram;porting :-;ugar for Utah-Idaho
Nngar Company W<"l'<\ as guilt)· of violating the law a:-;
HcJ\I'IP)T had hel•n. '!'hey had no right to usP the publi('
hig·lt\\'a~·s ol' l!tah for :om<·h purpose. 'l'he falla(~y or
plaintiffs' position is demonstrated by this simple fae . .
tnal statenwnt:
(a) Since 1;epeal of the "15 mile" exemption, plaintiffs' transportation of sugar from \Vest Jordan to Salt
Lake City could not reRi upon th(' "Hi mile" exemption.
It \Vas gone.
(b)

Plaintiffs at no time held a general contract

carrier's permit (assuming such type of p·ermit is authorized by law), but its contract carrier's permits covered
contractees other than the Sugar Company and specifically covered other route.".

(c) The plaintiffs at no time obtained a contract
carrier's permit for their sugar hauling operations.
The plaintiffs continued their illegal operation::-;
even after they filed their application for the permit now
involved. Note the following exchange between Commissioner Hacking and the witness Elmer L. Sims:
''CoMMISSIONER HACKING: As I understand
your testimony, you have rendered this service
to the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company at West Jordan
for some considerable period of time?
A. Yes.
CoM. HACKING: And are still rendering it.
As you stated, you sent a truck out yesterday!
A. Yes." (R. 84)
There is a suggestion in the testimony of plaintiffs'
witnesses that they had filed with the Commission a contract with the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company other than
the contract now involved in this action. (R. 71, 85) The
contention of plaintiffs (R. 71, 85) that the mere filing
of the other contract (if one existed; it was never found)
with the Commission was a sufficient compliance with
the law, is a ridiculous conception. The mere filing of a
contract with the Commission is certainly not obtaining
a permit.
With respect to sugar hauling opeartions for the
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, the plaintiffs were not in
a position to claim the benefits of the "grandfather"
clause, either as a substantive or as a procedural right.
First, because on January 1, 1940 they transported sugar
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mtd<'l' tlu• "1:-J ntile" Pxemption. A.t tlw hearing they
J"<·peatPdl:-· tnnde this elaim. This operation certainly
,,. as 11 ot a <"On trad <·a niPr ope ration. Second, they had
lw<~ll <·ngwz.·<'d si II<"<' }I a.\· ~' 1945 in an illegal orwra-

tion, awl lllldPr tlw doc-trine or tlw Rowley eas('
shonld lw dPni<·d the right to aP:-<Prt thP JH'i"dleges of th.~
· 'grandfntlH·r'' <~lanse. 'J'he Commission committed no
error in its J'ailme to make a Jjnding regarding the
statns of plaintiffs as a eontrad motor <'arrier on .Janna ry 1, J 940. The absence of any su<'h finding from the
n~eonl is wholly justified because plaintiffs on January
l, 1940 operated under the "15 mile" exemption and
also because of plaintiffs' illegal use of public highways
of the fitate of Utah subsequent to May 8, 1945.

Ill.
THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A CONTRACT CARRIER PERMIT
WAS NOT AN ARBITRARY ACT OF THE COMMISSION, BUT WAS BASED UPON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHICH NEGATIVED PLAINTIFFS' RlGR'l' 1'0 S\JCR PERMIT.

Plaintiffs have argued in this litigation that even
if their purported or alleged rights under the "grandfather" clause are eliminated from consideration, the~·
;.;uhmitted to the Commission substantial evidence which
Pntitl<'d them to a coniraet carrier's permit. 'Phis is
hut auotlwr way of asserting that the Finding~ of the
Conuni:-;sion are not supported by substantial eYidene~~
and that its rl.0nial of the applieation was eaprieious and
arbitrar.\·, alld therefore eonstituted error of which the
Supn•mp Cunrt ma.\· tnk(' eogru11ant•e in these proeeed-

ings. With respect to the Supreme Court's authority on
this aspect of the case, the following quotation from
Goodrich vs. Public Service Commission et al, (----. Ut.
______ , 198 Pac. 2d 975) is pertinent:
"We have repeatedly held that in reviewing
cases certified to this court from the Public Service Commission on a statement of error that the
Commission's report, findings, conclusions and
order are unlawful, we are limited in our review
to ascertaining whether or not the Commission
had before it substantial evidence upon which to
base its decision. Only in the event that we find
the Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously or
unreasonably in denying applicant's petition can
we set aside the order.''

It was the obligation of the plaintiffs to demonstrate to the Commission by competent evidence that:
(a) the highway over which the applicant desired to
operate was not unduly burdened; (b) the granting of
the application would not unduly interfere with the
traveling public; (c) the granting of the application
would not be detrimental to the best interests of the
public of the State of Utah and/or to the localities
served; and (d) the existing transportation facilities do
not provide adequate or reasonable service ( ~ee. 76-5-21
Utah Code 1943, as amended by Chapter JOt} Laws of
Utah 1945 ). rrhe burden was upon thr plaintiffs to estahlish these conditions.
However, the defendants will assume in their argument on this aspect of the case (without waiving their
contention that the plaintiffs are not entitled to "grandfather rights") that thf~ plaintiffs in this application
-3G

\\ un· a

t~ouiract

nwiur earner ou ,J auuary 1, Hl4U, awl

were entilcd prima facie to a eontraei carrier's permit
nnuer the construction of th<~ statute hereinbefore suhmitted under point I of this hrid. This problem is therefore approaeherl witl1 ih<· assumption that the plaintiffs,
without submitting any further Pvidence than their contrad carrier status on .January 1, 1940, "made tht~ir
('asp" a ll<1 east the burden on the defendant carrier of
gomg· t'or\\'ard with the evidence to disestablish this
prnua i'aei<• rig·ht to a permit. rl'his is a radieal eon<'P,ssion in plaintiffs' favor, hut the d<•fendant earrier
makes this hypothdieal <~oneession in the full faith aud
Jwli<>f that tlw eYidence snhmittt~d by it pins the admissions of 11r. H. \V. Ansell, a \vitnpss on behalf ot' the
plaintiffs, full~' supports tlw Findings of tht> Conuuis:-:ion . .\lr .•\nsp]] was the U<'nPral 'l'raffie Manager or
tfw laah-fdaho Nugar Company, and th<> :--Iugar Compan~- \\·ould Jw the dired Jwnef1ciary of any <'ontrad
earrier's rwnuit granted plaintiffs. (R. 87) ln this emlneetion, 1\lr. Ans<•ll 's admission upon eross exawination
1s most JH'rtill<'llt:

"Q. Do I un<lerstand you only eall on :-:;all
TmnsfPr in these rmergen<'ieB 'l

Lak(~

A. ln general, yes. It might lw times whtm
our offiec is rushed, and rather than ealling
:.\f agna-Garfield and then \Vaiting for a while to
see whether they can do it or not, they just want
to :;:atisfy that man, anrl they f'all the Salt Lake
'l ransfur Company.

(l As a matter of fad, it is a <·ontinuous
praetiee, isn't it, Mr. AnsPll, PllJPrgPney or no
('JllPl'gPil<')'?

A. No, I don't think so. I wouldn't say that.
Q. Do you know?

A. Well, I know that we endeavor to give the
Magna-Garfield a good share of our business, oi
the normal business, you might say.

Q. Then you are representing to this Commission that this contract really only becomes
operative in these emergency periods; is that
correct?
A. In general.
Q. \Vhy do you qualify it, in general~ Why
that expression j?

.

A. \Vell, as l just said, something might come
up after lunch, and the man wants his sugar
delivered to him that day.
Q. So, it is pretty much of a practic-e through-

out the year, isn't it?
A. To the extent it could happen almost any
time.
Q. So, this isn't an emergency at all. It is
a continuous process yon contemplate?
* * * * *
A. I have endeavored to show these things
happen on a little unusual cirrumstaneP, and, in
general, as I keep saying, we give the MagnaGarfield a steady flow of business when they can
give us the service we require. But if some occasion has brought about necessity for quick service
from West Jordan within the hour, then we give
the business to the Salt Lake Transfer Company.
Q. \Vell, now, with this new contract, if it is
approved by the Commission and a permit issm~d,
you are going to give the Salt Lake rrransfPr all
the hm;inPss, aren't you'?
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A. No, Umt it-l not tnH'. \\' c would ;.:till give
thP l\lagna-<Jarii1•]d the hu:-;ine;.:s on whieh there
i:-; no emerg<>Jl<'.'' J'or qniek fleliYer:·.

Q. vVell, .IJOil hare no criticism of the handlin!J
of the ship111e11ts l1.1J Ma.rnw d' Oatfield, thai .IJOil
have gi1:en to them'?
A. No; it lws been

Ve!'Jf

satisfactory.

Q. Ycm h(LVe no criticism of its automotive
equipmrnt il usrs in that respect?
A. No.
Q. Your wltole ('CJTltPJltion i..:, tilPll, nll·.
Ansr>ll, that the common earrier hen· inn>lH•d
<'amwt render this emergem·)·, i;.: that tlte tlwor:·:,
which emergency ;.:ervice is brought about h:·
comparativ<~ conditions~

A.
servir.t~,

'rhat 's right, cannot rend<>r a s pPed.''
would probably l>e a lwt tf•r word 1lulll

'Pill(' q.!,'l'll<'_\' '.

Q. And the handling of sugar doPs no! rc•quire any partie11lar t.''Pf' of automotive> equipment, cine;.: it?
A. No,
,,·eat!trr, of'

c·X<~ept

it ltas got to hc• h·pt l'ront tit\~

<~our;.:l~.

Q. Of course. And .IJOU hai'C 1111 r:omplai11f of
the equifJIIIr'lll of !he l1la_cJJW-Oorfteld on /h({/
:-:eorr?

A. I do no!." (ftalies ;.:npplied) (R. 104, 10:J,
1()(), 107)
'l'lte>rPI'ore, plaintiff:-~' 0\\'11 evi<LPJJ<'(' PNtabli~lws hP·'
yond peraO\'Pil1nrP that thP d1•t'endani earriPr

h;l;.: l'Pn-

J.ered to the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company a service which
has been free from criticism, and which has been very
satisfactory. Furthermore, Mr. Ansell admits that the
Sugar Company has no complaint as to the type oi
equipment used by the defendant carrier. It is weather
proof equipment. It is obvious from Mr. Ansell's testimony that the Sugar Company supported plaintiffs' application on the single basis that it could obtain fro:r1
the applicants a speedier service. The issue therefore
becomes a narrow one, and that is whether the defendant
carrier proved that it can render this speedier service.
The evidence on behalf of the defendant carrier definitely
proves that it has both the equipment and the personnel
to render this speediPr service. The President of the
defendant carrier denied the assertion that his company was not able to rPnder the Sugar Company the
service required by it. (R. 144, 145, 151) He describeJ.
at length the equipment maintained and operated by the
defendant carrier. The company maintains a regular
schedule to Bingham and Oarfwld. (R. 142) The regularly scheduled trucks leave ~aJt Lake at 10:00 A.M.
each week-day morning, but his company is prepared to
furnish other and additional trucks in any emergency.
( R. 153) Three trucks are operated on !.he Sal lLh.
Bingham route, and one on the Salt Lake-Garfield route.
(R. 153) The Company owns eight trucks at pres en
and employs six drivers, but it has available sources t;J
secure other automotive equipment upon immediate demand, and has available two emergency drivers. (R. 142,
143) In the knowledge of the PrPsideni there was only
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one instanee of the d<>fendaHt <·arrier's failure lo emuply
\Yith the Sugar Company's request, and that was a d<"mand late in the afternoon for a delivery within a half
hour from the call. The President explained to the Sugar
Company that he could not meet the demand for a delivery within the half hour, but was prepared to make it
within two hours. (R. 144) No employee of the defendant
carrier is authorized to refuse any shipments. (R. 157,
158) The haulage of sugar from the \Vest Jordan factory is on the Salt Lake-Bingham operation of defendant carrier. (R. 152) On the return trip from Bingham
these trucks are authorized to make "pickups" at intermediate points. (R. 156) 'l'he back haul is very small,
and a stop at the \Vest .Jordan factory to pick up Ll
shipm<~nt would be entirely possible. (R. 156) If the
8 ugar (; ornpany requires full t ruek loads to lw mo n~d,
the defen<lant carriPr is prepared, upon notification, t•l
provide sLH·h truek equipment. (R 151) 'l'he dd<~ndan~
enniPJ' is pl'PJlarP<l at all time:,.; to renrler the Sugar Conlpany th<~ qni!'k delin~ries of large quantities of sugar to
Salt Lake City. (R. 145) Speci1ically, the PrPsident of dc·fenrlant company denie<l the testimony of tlw Sugar
Company witness that the defenrlant carrier had not
been able to rendrr the service required by the Sugar
Company, in view of eompetiti,·e conditions in Salt Lake
City. ( R. 145) lle ass<~rtP<l that his company was able
and willing to handle the sanw quantities of sugar as
have h<~en handl<•d by the HJ1I)licants, and to r<•ndPr tlw
transportation :-:<'rviee with the f'ame speud ancl <'ffi<'ieney
as the apTJ11eantf;. (R 145)

,
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It is not the task of the Supreme Court to weigh
evidence or resolve confiicts in evidence. Its function
in reviewing cases of this type is to determine whether
there was substantial eidence before the Commission to
support its findings. Conflicts in the evidence as to
whether the defendant carrier was ready, willing and
able to render the so-called speedier service were for
the Commission alone to resolve. By its findings the
Commission resolved this issue against the plaintiffs.
At this hearing there was no issue concerning the burdening of the West Jordan-Salt Lake highway, or of
undue interference with the traveling public. The evidence was directed solely to the question whether the
granting of the application would be detrimental to the
best interests of the State of Utah and/or to the localities to be served, and as to whether the existing transportation facilities provide adequate and reasonable
service. There was substantial evidence before the Commission from which it could reasonably find that the
transportation facilities offered hy the defr~ndant ~ar
rier were and would be adequate and reasonahlP, en~n
considering the extraordinary demand of tlw 8ugar
Company for "speedier service." '!'he evidence also
justified the Commission in reaching the conclusion that
public interest would he damaged if it granted the 1'<'questecl permit. In this connection the quotation from
People's Transit Company v. Henshaw (8 Cir., 20 F('rl.
2cl 87 at p. 90) quoted in th(' Mrnarthv opinion, snpra,
is appropriate:
"The results of such comp0tition, whf'rP t;hen~
is not suffieient business to snstain all of tlw
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competitors, i:,; that a season of experience causes
all or some to drop out or compels the purchase
of competitors ( u~ually at exaggerated amounts),
thus causing an increase of capital expenditure
of the purchasers upon which the charges to the
public must be based and thereby increaf'ed.
"These com;iderations, and others, amply
differences to protect and preserve th,,
t•xisting permanent system. No new system ha~
a legal right to destroy sueh existing system all<l
have the public at its merey. rrhe public welfare
is not ::;erved, but harmed thereb~'· The publie
may protect itself against such results. Nor can
;my th0or,\' of free competition change this situation. Competition is recognized and encouraged
for the sole rea:son that it is supposed to result
in the public good. But competition is not necessarily unrestrainable. It cannot be allowed to
harm the very public it was designed to proteet
and aiJ. It may be restrained for the public welfare just the same as monopoly may be restrained
or as competition may be left unrestrained. The
test in each instance is the public good. ·where
the restraint upon competition is for the public
good, it is sustainable just as restraint upon
freedom of action by the individual is valid where
for the public good. Such is the basis of and the
reason for the entire poliee power.''
ju~tify

1. It will be detrimental to the best interests of

the public and to the localities served, to grant
the permit to plaintiffs.

The decision in the instant case may in a general
manner set a precedent with respect to motor vehicle
transportation in the State of Utah, and far-reaching
consequences may result therefrom. The problem presenteJ to the Commission was an exeeeclingly important
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one, not only to the plaintiffs, Uw defendant earner of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company but also to
the puhlic at large. There 1s fundamentally 111volved the responsibility of the Public Service Commission with respect to its administration of the ae~
governing transportation by motor vehicles. One of the
principal purposes of the act is to insure that the public
will secure an efficient permanent transportation service,
whether that service be rendered by common or contraet
carriers. It is the duty of the Commission to administer
the law with wisdom and foresight, to the end that the
public may be best served. The spirit of the act envisions
a state-wide transportation system composed of numerous units, be they either common or contract carriers,
who are financially respons:ble and are ready, willing
and able to furnish to the public the service that it deserves and requires. While neither certificates of convenience and necessity nor contract carrier permits
grant any monopoly, and certainly do not vest in the
recipients thereof any right to be free from competition
or to hold a monopoly against the public, there exi~ts
intrinsically in the regulatory provisions of the statute
the purpose and intention of the legislature to prevent
uncontrolled competition between motor carriers of such
nature as would eventually either seriously impair transportation facilities or perhaps utterly destroy them. By
vesting in the Commission a controlled: discretion as· ttJ
either granting or withholding certificates and permit::-;,
dependent :upon circumstances, the legislature evinced
its intc~ntion that motor vPhif'le transportation should
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be so regulated as to prevent the evils of a monopoly on
the one hand and the destructive influence of uncontrolled
competition on the other. It is by striking a happy me-dium between the two extremes that the Commissio11
achieves the purpose of the law. An administrative
body like the Conuni~Rion is best qualified to weigh and
measur(~ the fact~ and ('in~um::;taneP~ of a gin~n ease, tn
onler to strike this balance.

It vwuld be lawful for the Commission, under facts
and circmnstances which control the exercise of its diseretion, to i::;sue a C'ontract carrier permit over the identical route ot', and in competition with a previously auth-~
ori7,ed common carrier. The law did not intend that a
('OllUHon carrier holding a Certificate ~hould have, for
all time, a monopoly on the transportation over the
route serve(l by it, but this is not necessarily justification for licensing competing carriers where there is no
public interest involved. The Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Utah Light d!; Traction Company 1'.
Public Service Cornrnission of Utah, (101 Ut. 9!1; 118
Pac. 2cl 68:~ at 690) stated :

" * '~ * but when a territory is satisfactorily
serviced and its transportation facilities are ample,
a duplication of such service, which unfairly interferes with existing carriers rnay undermine and
weaken the transportation setup generally, anrl
thtts deprive the public of an effic,ient, pernwnf'11t
service."
The defendant can·i(~r is the ownPr nncl holder of a
Certificate of CfiHvenien('e a11il~ Nec-~ssit~: issuPd h;v tlw
Pnblie Serviee Commission, authorizing it 1o C'any -on

the business of a common earner between Salt Lake
City and Bingham, Utah, over the highways stated in
said Certificate. The West Jordan factory of the Sugar
Company is served by this common carrier route. There
is a public necessity existing for the maintenance of a
motor vehicle common carrier operation between Salt
Lake and Bingham. At the latter point is conducted on,•
of the most important industriPs in the State of Utah,
and the service of that community by an efficient, financially responsible common motor carrier is of great importance, not only to Bingham and Salt Lake City, but
also to the public at large. While Bingham is served by
common carriers by rail, operations of the defendant
carrier over a long period of time have proved the fad
that there does exist a necessity and demand for motor
vehicle carrier servicP. 'l'he Commission, by granting
the Certificate to the defendant earrier, has in effect
found such fact. The maintenance of such service in an
efficient manner, i::o of course dependent primarily upon
the finaueial returns received by the defendant carrier,
and these returns are dependent upon the volume of
business ari::oing not only in Salt Lake City and Bingham, but also along its route. The business of the Sugar
Company in the movement of sugar to Salt Lake City
from its West Jordan factory is a legitimate contribution to the financial welfare of defendant carrier. Prirria
facie this business belongs to the common carriers which
serve the fadory, provided, of course, that their service
is adequate. The defendant carrier is ready, willing and
able to furnish the service to the Sugar Company whicl1
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will meet its demands and requirements, resultant upon
the highly competitive conditions revealed by the evidence. The testimony of the Sugar Company witness in
its fullest thrust serves only to establish the fact that
should this permit be granted, the Sugar Company will
be given additional choice of carriers. But this fact
does not establish the ultimate fact which must be found
by the Commission, viz: that it will not be detrimental
to the best interests of the people and of the localities
to be served if such permit is granted. It is vigorously
urged by the defendants that there is no basis in fact to
justify the Commission in introducing competition 1n
the hauling of sugar between West Jordan and Salt
Lake City as against the defendant carrier. The result
of granting such permit would only be to subtract from
the defendant carrier a certain volume of business in
order to give the Sugar Company a further choice of
carriers. rrhe granting of the permit might very well
establish a pattern for the Commission in similar cases
which are sure to arise. Let there be a certain number
of incidents, destructive competition between carirers
will be tmcouraged rather than restrained as contemplated by the law. rl'he mere c-onvenience of one shipper
along a common carrier route is not sufficient reason
to justify the Commission in introducing competition
against its previously licensed common carrier where
there is no evidence that the public at large will benefit
from the same.
The crux of the plaintiffs' case is simply this: The
Sugar Company encounters vigorous competitiOn trorn
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other sugar companies which maintain large stocks or
sugar in Salt Lake City, and it seeks to meet this competition by securing from the plaintiffs a transportatiOn
service which the evidence fails to prove as being necessary, but which simply serves the convenience of the
Sugar Company. It is the contention of defendants that
such evidence utterly fails to support a finding that the
granting of the application would not be detrimental tu
the best interests of the peopl eand of the localities
served. If the mere convenience of one shipper on defendant carrier's route is reason for the Commission
introducing competition against it, like convenience of
other shippers, multiplied several times, may easily
destroy defendant carrier's business. This is the exact
type of competition which the statute intende(l the Commission to control or restrict. Let it he suppose(! that
other owners of motor vc>hiclPs apply to the Commission
frir eontract canier pc>rmib over defendant canif'r's
route, and hasc> their applieations upon assPrtPd eom'enwnee of ('Prtain otlwr shipp<>rs. \Vhat will tlwn lw tlw
attitude o[' the Commission when it is faeC>rl ·with the
prohlem of eitlwr serving the <'Onveni<>m·e of thP shipper,.;,
or weakening tlw ahilit)' of the dcfemlant carrier to IWT'form its public sPrviec "I 'rlw time to stop such procl'ss
is at the pres(mt. 'l'}w pnhlie good can he best S<'l'VPtl
hy sustaining defendant earrier in its common carrier
operation over the route involved.
2. Existing transportation facilities operated by
defendant carrier provide adequate and reasonable service over its route.

The Commission, in order to justify the issuance of
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a permit to plaintiffs, must also find that existing tram;portation facilities over the Salt Lake-Bingham route do
not provide adequate or reasonable service. The evidence in this case does not even suggest that the defendant
carrier has failed in any respect in the performance of
its duties as common carrier over the route involved.
No complaint has been registered against defendent carrier for its failure to serve the public. The Sugar Company witness at the hearing frankly stated that the basis
of the application was solely a question of speedier
rather than emergency service. In other words, there
Llc:i .1 ,n::e admiss:on by this witness that defendant
carrier is ready, willing and able to render even the socalled emergency service to the Sugar Company. Apparently the only criticism which the Sugar Company
could make against defendant carrier's service was the
question of time. 'l'here is not a scintilla of evidence in
the record that defendant carrier does not possess adequate automotive equipment nor the necessary personnel
to operate the equipment. The testimony of the President of the defendant carrier, assuring the Commission
of the ability of his company to perform its functions
as common carrier, stands uncontradicted, and even the
Sugar Company witnes:-: did not dispute this statement.
The flpfendant carrier atlmitted frankly that there had
been one occasion when tlH• Sugar Company requested
a movement of sugar within a half hour's time, and due to
~'\-r~\\lli':'.\1:\n~~'i'>
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must :-:tami a:-: a deiinit<• l'acl in this rase. The President
of thP defendant earri.er dpc)ar<~d that IJis C~ompany was
in a position, upon dc'lllalld of thP Rugar Company, to
di:-:pateh Pxtra trnek:-: in ordPr to effec-t this "speedy"
cleliY<·ry of sugar into Ralt LakP. It is impossible, therefore•, to torture from this P\'idenc~e a finding that existing tran:-:portatlou faeilities, as fnrnishcd by c1efendant
<"arrier, do not provide adequate or reasonable service
for the shippers along its route, be they the public in
general or the Sugar Company in particular. There is
no particular conHict of evidence in this ease, when it is
carefully analyzed and considered. Unless the Commission could find that defendant earrier's transportation
facilities now and in the future do not provide adequate
and reasonable serYice, it is not authorized to grant the
plaintiffs' application.

'I'he defendants earnestly submit to the Court that
the Commission committed no error in denying plaintiffs' application for a contract carrier permit to serve
the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company from its West Jordan
Plant.
Respedfnlly :mbmitted,
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